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THE DEPERSONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE 
USE OF TITLE AS A SECURITY DEVICE
Mr Vice-Principal, sir, honoured guests, colleagues, ladies and 
gentlemen, the topic of my address tonight is the
depersonalization of the concept of ownership in contemporary 
society brought about by the use of title as a security device. I 
intend to have a look at the concomitant tensions that this
phenomenon has given rise to in the law and which, in my opinion, 
cannot be adequately resolved with reference to the existing 
principles of the Law of Property. It is an undeniable fact that
the various rules and concepts of the Law of Property reflect the
1social policy of the society in which the legal system prevails. 
The comprehensive regulation of production and the allocation of 
resources is of fundamental importance to the wellbeing of any 
society. In the contemporary world such co-operation and co­
ordination necessary to achieve social purposes, will take one of
2two basic forms: autonomous ordering or collective ordering.
According to the thinking of capitalist free enterprise Western 
society, substantive decisions relative to the production and 
distribution of goods and services should, as far as possible, 
be autonomous rather than collective. Thus it is that natural 
and juristic persons, on their own account, make significant 
decisions regarding the utilization and allocation of resources 
and, through a process of dickering, co-operate to achieve
4economic and social purposes. In these societies the Law of 
Property is highly developed. The concept of private ownership 
forms the cornerstone of the economic system and commercial
5activity is motivated purely by economic considerations. In 
socialist societies, on the other hand, where the utilization and 
allocation of resources is effected by collective ordering, the 
Law of Property is poorly developed.6 The state enterprises 
involved in production and distribution make no significant
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decisions regarding the utilization and distribution of 
resources. The responsibility for making such decisions is 
placed in the hands of public officials charged with social and
economic planning who, by means of a planned economy, are able to
7achieve social purposes directly.
Bearing in mind that the rules and principles of the Law of 
Property necessarily reflect the economic realities of a given 
society, it is important to appreciate that these rules and
principles "once established and defined__seem to move among
themselves according to the rules of a game which exists for its
g
own purposes". Such movement is an indication of the fact that 
the substance of the rule may have changed whilst its form has 
been preserved. In consequence of such "movement", a legal rule
which was originally developed to meet a particular economic or 
social situation is subsequently applied to an entirely different 
set of circumstances in order to bring about a result that was
never intended or even contemplated when the rule was first
9introduced.
One of the most striking examples of the change in the function 
of legal rules and principles to meet new circumstances has been 
the development of the hire-purchase10 concept and more recently 
the use of the legal device of a lease in sectors of the economic 
market in which previously the Law of Purchase and Sale
dominated. It is a fact of life today that office equipment,
industrial machinery, motor vehicles and durable consumer goods 
are as often hired out by large financial corporations as they 
are sold. Indeed, finance corporations actively discourage the 
acquisition of such property ( even on hire-purchase terms) by
advertising that the modern businessman does not burden himself
with the ownership of plant and equipment, etc, but rather leases 
them. The effect of these developments has been to bring about a 
depersonalization of the concept of ownership. These 
developments have, to a large extent, resulted in the
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disappearance of the highly personal and individual character of 
ownership, in the sense of an owner exercising personal control 
over the thing which he owns. Until relatively recently, a highly 
personal characteristic was inherent in the very notion of 
ownership and in the Law of Property generally. The 
depersonalization of the idea of ownership and the loss of the 
personal contact between the owner and that which he owns, has in 
many instances meant that an owner will often no longer exercise 
the degree of control over his property to which he is entitled 
in law. Moreover, it has meant that the owner often does not
exercise the degree of control over his property which he ought 
to exercise to make it possible for the rules of the Law of 
Property to be effectively and efficiently applied. These rules 
were developed against the social and economic background of a
society in which it was assumed that the owner of the thing would
11usually be in actual control of it.
It seems apposite , at this stage, to say something about the 
nature of the Law of Property. Were a layman to be asked to
define "property", he would most likely say that "property" is 
something tangible "owned" by a natural or juristic person. Such 
a response would be inaccurate from a lawyer's point of view. In 
legal language the word "property" is a complex term. Its exact 
meaning can only be defined in the context in which it is used. 
Reduced to its most elementary components, the word "property" 
has two different legal meanings. It will always signify two 
distinct and separate legal concepts: first, the right of
ownership in a thing and secondly, the thing to which the right 
12of ownership relates.
It must not be supposed from what has just been said, however,
that the Law of Property is concerned solely with a study of the 
13right of ownership. It has a wider scope than that. In
14essence it is that branch of the private law which deals with 
real rights in property or physical corporeal things15 in
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general . The rights which flow from the Law of Property are real 
rights in the sense that that are, in general, enforceable
against all other persons. In other words, such rights are 
enforceable against any person who seeks to deal with the thing 
in any manner inconsistent with the power of the holder of the 
real right to exert control over the thing. A real right thus 
gives rise to a direct relationship between the holder of the 
right and the thing to which that right relates.16 The object of 
a real right is the thing itself and the duty correlative to the 
right is generally17 binding on all other persons.18 In 
contradistinction, a personal right is binding only against 
certain persons. The object of a personal right is the legally
enforceable claim against another, that that other will do a
19given act or not do a given act, and the duty correlative to
the right is binding only on those legal subjects who are aware
20of the existence of the right. The Law of Property thus 
embraces the concept of ownership, possession and various so- 
called jura in re aliena, ie real rights in the property of 
another - more particularly servitudes, mortgages, hypothecs, 
pledges and liens.
Ownership is an abstract legal conception which comprises of the 
aggregate of all the interests (ie the rights, powers and
privileges) which may exist between a person and a thing. Such
21interests are traditionally said to be :
(1) The right to possess - ius possidendi.
(2) The right of exclusion - ius prohibendi.
(3) The right of disposition - ius disponendi.
(4) A right of use - ius utendi.
(5) A right to use and enjoy the fruits and profits - ius 
fruendi.
(6) A right of destruction -ius abutendi.
The first and the second of these interests, namely, the ius 
possidendi and the ius prohibendi are clearly rights under the
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Hohfeldian analysis of such interests. The ius utendi, the ius 
fruendi and the ius abutendi would be better categorized as
"privileges" and the ius disponendi as a "power". In Civil law
22tradition, South African law adopts a unitary view of ownership 
and emphasizes dominium, ie the aggregate of all the various 
interests that may exist between a person and a thing, rather
than the various separate interests that are included in
23ownership, as does the Common law. The unitary concept of 
dominium does not envisage that all the various rights, powers 
and privileges in relation to the thing owned must vest in the 
owner at any one time. The owner has the capacity to vest some 
or other of his interests in another person or other persons for 
a period. An owner may, therefore, vest in another the right to 
possess, together with the privilege to use and to enjoy the 
fruits of the property, by letting the property in terms of a 
lease agreement. Likewise, the owner may grant to another the 
real right of security in some property of his in order to secure 
a debt or the performance of some obligation which is due to that 
other. The real right of security confers upon the holder of 
the right the power to demand that the property be sold in the 
event of the debtor's failure to perform and the privilege to 
have his claim paid out of the proceeds of the property in 
priority to any other unsecured creditor. A right of security 
thus creates a direct relationship between the holder of the 
right and the subject matter which serves as the object of his 
right, while at the same time laying lame the various rights, 
powers and privileges which the law vests in the owner by virtue 
of his ownership.
A question which naturally arises in this regard is why the 
modern hire-purchase transaction and the leasing contract of 
durable consumer goods, as well as commercial and industrial 
capital goods, has become so prevalent in the economic market in 
which previously the Law of Purchase and Sale dominated. There 
seem to be two main reasons for this development. First, leasing 
contracts provide an opportunity to obtain tax benefits and
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concessions which would otherwise not be available. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly for the purpose of my discussion 
tonight, both are devices designed to overcome difficulty 
encountered by suppliers in obtaining adequate security for 
relatively long term financing. The difficulty arises because 
the creation of a real right of security in movable property by
way of a pledge, requires that the pledgee be given and retain
possession of the movable property which serves as the object of 
the right of security.
The availability of credit is of crucial importance in any
developed economy. Inasmuch as commercial contracts merely give
rise to the creation of personal rights against the debtor, the 
extension of credit is, to a large extent, dependent upon the 
availability of devices which enable a creditor to ensure the 
satisfaction of his claim in the event of non-performance by the 
debtor of his obligations arising out of the contract. The need 
for such devices arises out of the fact that the contractual 
remedies available against the debtor take time to enforce and 
may indeed, turn out to be worthless should the debtor prove to 
be a man of straw. The insolvency of a debtor brings about a 
concursus creditorum, a coming together of all the creditors who 
share proportionately in the proceeds of the debtor's estate. 
In the absence of special provisions, each creditor is limited 
to a proportionate sharing in the proceeds of the debtor's 
estate. The prudent.creditor, therefore, requires some means 
whereby the satisfaction of his claim can be secured.
25Various devices exist in our law for the purpose of creating a
26right of security by agreement between the debtor and the 
creditor. Of particular importance to the topic under discussion 
is the creation of a real right of security by agreement. This 
involves the situation whereby a specified asset (or assets) 
belonging to the debtor, or to someone acting on behalf of the 
debtor, is set aside for the purpose of ensuring satisfaction of
the creditor's claim in the event of non-performance by the 
debtor. In this regard a distinction is drawn between real 
rights of security created in movable and in immovable property. 
In relation to immovable property, real rights of security are 
created by registration of a special mortgage bond over immovable 
property in the Deeds Registry. With the exception of special
notarial bonds created in Natal in terms of the Special Notarial 
27Bond Act, special and general notarial bonds of movable
property provide an inferior form of protection for the creditor
and it is really a misnomer to refer to them as a form of 
28security. Outside of Natal, therefore, the only institution for 
the creation of a real right of security in movable property in 
South African law is by way of pledge. In contemporary society, 
however, pledge is an unsatisfactory institution for the creation 
of real rights of security and has, for that reason, declined in 
importance to the extent that it is rarely used in practice 
today, not only in South Africa, but also in other Civil Law 
based legal systems.
There are three basic and essential requirements for a workable 
29system of real security. First, the world at large should be 
adequately informed of the creditor's right. It is only proper 
that other creditors, actual or potential, of the debtor should 
know that a creditor, by reason of his right of security, has a 
preferential claim to the proceeds of some asset forming part of 
the debtor's patrimony. In the case of pledge this requirement 
is achieved by demanding that the creditor be placed in
possession and that he retain possession of the property which
30serves as the object of his right of security. Secondly, the 
creditor must be adequately protected . With pledge this is 
achieved by giving the creditor a real right in and to the
property pledged, a right in other words, which avails against
31all the world as it were. Thirdly, the debtor must be 
adequately protected against abuse by the creditor. This is 
achieved in the case of pledge by reserving the right of 
ownership in the property to the debtor,32 and he retains the
right to redeem the property on payment of the debt. This right 
cannot be taken from the debtor even if he agrees with the 
creditor, at the time of creating the security, that he shall be 
deprived thereof in certain contingencies - pacta commissoria are 
illegal. 33
It is the first essential requirement of a workable system of 
security, namely, the publicity requirement, which makes the 
institution of pledge an unworkable system of real security in 
contemporary society. Creditors often do not have the facilities 
to take charge of and do not want the responsibility of taking 
care of the debtor's property for the duration of the existence 
of the right of security. Moreover, the debtor normally has need 
of and is unwilling to part with possession of the property 
tendered as security for the payment of the debt. These factors, 
which make it difficult to obtain security to finance the 
acquisition of plant, equipment and durable consumer goods have 
given rise to the use of title, or the right of ownership of 
movable corporeals, as a means of obtaining security for the 
repayment of loans advanced by financial institutions for the 
acquisition of such goods. A typical example is the use a 
hire-purchase transaction. A supplier sells the goods in terms 
of a hire-purchase agreement, the price to be paid in instalments 
over a period. In order to secure his right to payment, the 
supplier, by means of a pactum reservati domini, reserves the 
right of ownership in the goods until such time as the price has 
been paid. On default of the purchaser, the supplier is 
entitled to rescind the contract and claim return of the property 
sold. In addition, by reason of his right of ownership, the 
supplier is unaffected by a subsequent re-sale of the property 
by the hire-purchase buyer in contravention of the agreement. As 
the owner, he has a vindicatory action. This action entitles him 
to recover the property from whomsoever may be in possession and 
without the necessity of having to pay compensation - not even to 
a bona fide subsequent purchaser who acquired the property from
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the fraudulent hire-purchase buyer. A hire-purchase
transaction coupled with a pactum reservati domini, alters the 
normal consequences of delivery of property in pursuance of a 
contract of sale where the purchaser is given credit, in other 
words, where he is allowed time within which to pay the price.
34
There are three fundamental points which are of importance in 
relation to the topic under discussion tonight. First, delivery 
or traditio is a derivative mode of acquisition of ownership - 
the transferee acquires ownership from the transferor. Traditio 
thus requires the co-operation of both parties. Secondly, in 
South African law, following Roman and Roman-Dutch law, the 
conclusion of a contract of sale does not involve a passing of 
ownership of the subject matter of the contract. The purchaser,
therefore, does not become the owner until the thing sold has 
35been delivered to him. Moreover, the seller, in entering into 
the contract of sale, does not guarantee that he is the owner or 
that he will make the purchaser the owner, he merely undertakes 
to give the purchaser vacant possession and warrants that the 
purchaser will not be disturbed in his possession by some third36
party who has a valid title to the property. It follows,
therefore, that there can in our law be the valid sale of a res
37aliena ie property belonging to a third party. The fact that 
the seller is not the owner and cannot make the purchaser the 
owner of the property sold, therefore does not invalidate the38
sale. In the absence of fraud on the part of the seller, the 
purchaser will have no cause for complaint until such time as he 
is disturbed in his possession by a third party who has a
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breach of his so-called warranty against eviction. Thirdly, 
South African law applies an abstract theory of the passing of 
ownership. In terms of this theory, the intention of the parties 
is of crucial importance in determining whether ownership will 
pass on delivery or traditio - not the validity of the underlying
causa, in the form of a contract of sale, donation or exchange,
40which gives rise to the decision to pass ownership.
According to the abstract theory , there are three requirements 
which must be satisfied for traditio pursuant to a contract of 
sale, for instance, to effect a transfer of ownership from the 
seller to the purchaser. First, there is a mental element of a
justa causa traditionis: there must be a serious and deliberate
intention to pass and to receive ownership. Secondly, there is 
the factual element which requires an actual or constructive 
delivery of the subject matter of the contract by the seller to 
the purchaser. Thirdly, there is an incidental element which 
arises out of the rule expressed by the maxim nemo dat quid non 
habet. It follows, therefore, that the transferor must be the 
owner or have the authority of the owner, either actual or 
apparent, to effect a transfer of title to the purchaser. In the 
sale of movable goods, the first requirement of a valid traditio
- the justa causa traditionis - has to be determined
41inferentially from the circumstances of the case. In this 
regard a distinction is traditionally drawn between a cash and a 
credit sale. If the sale is for cash, then in addition to
delivery, ownership passes to the purchaser only upon payment of 
the price. On the other hand, if the sale is on credit, the
presumed intention of the parties is that ownership will pass on
delivery. These so-called rules of cash and credit sales are 
rules of construction based upon the implied intention of the 
parties. The contract of sale is a synallagmatic contract, which 
gives rise to an inference that one party is prepared to perform 
his part of the bargain on condition that the other party
performs his obligations under the contract. In the case of a 
cash sale, therefore, the inference is that the seller, in 
delivering the subject matter of the contract, intends to pass
39
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ownership against performance by the purchaser of his obligation, 
with the result that ownership only passes once the price is 
paid. In the case of a credit sale, on the other hand, because 
the seller is prepared to rely upon the good faith of the 
purchaser, in allowing him time within which to pay the price,
his intention must be to pass ownership upon delivery of the
42subject matter of the contract. The rule that in the case of a 
cash sale of movable property ownership passes only upon payment 
of the price is inextricably tied up with the question of title 
to the goods. In Roman-Dutch law it came to be realised, 
however, that the rule relating to cash sales could work 
injustices upon a bona fide subsequent purchaser who acquired the 
property from the purchaser on the strength of a belief that he 
was the owner of the property and, therefore, had the right to 
dispose of it. Roman-Dutch law thus introduced a modification to 
the rule to the effect that if the seller wished to retain the 
security of a right of ownership in the property sold, he had to 
assert his ownership within a specified period. Should he fail 
to do so, an irrebuttable presumption arose of an intention to
give credit and hence an intention to pass ownership to the 
43purchaser. The position is the same in modern South African 
law, save that there is no specified time within which the seller 
must assert his right of ownership. The rule simply is that the
seller must do so by claiming return of the property, within a 
44reasonable period.
The rule that in the case of a credit sale, ownership passes to 
the purchaser on delivery may always be altered by agreement 
between the parties. As I mentioned earlier, the practice in 
hire-purchase transactions, of including a pactum reservati 
domini, ie a clause expressly reserving ownership in the goods
sold until the full price has been paid, is firmly entrenched as
45a security device in our law. The reservation of ownership in 
a hire-purchase agreement is undoubtedly one of the most widely 
used security devices in relation to corporeal movable property 
in contemporary South African law. More recently, the use of a 
"sale and leaseback transaction" has been successfully invoked as
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a security device.
The use of title in this way, as a security device, is very 
effective in so far as the creditor is concerned. He retains or 
acquires ownership of the property which serves as the object of 
his right of security and enjoys the protection of a vindicatory
action. The interests of the debtor are, likewise, protected. 
47The Credit Agreements Act which embraces not only instalment 
sale transactions ( the new form of hire-purchase sales) but also 
leasing transactions, was introduced with the specific object of 
protecting debtors against abuse by their creditors. Security 
title, however, fails as an institution for the creation of a 
real right of security because it does not comply with the first 
requirement - the publicity requirement - of a workable system of 
real security. It provides no means whereby third parties can be 
appraised of the limitations on the right of the debtor, the 
hire-purchase buyer or lessee, in the property concerned. A 
subsequent purchaser of the property, for instance, is left 
wholly dependent upon the good faith of the debtor.
I have time to consider only one or two specific cases to 
illustrate my proposition that the depersonalization of the 
concept of ownership, brought about by the wide-scale use of 
title as a device to secure the payment of a debt, has created 
problems in the South African law which cannot be resolved with 
reference to the existing principles of law.
48Boland Bank Bpk v Joseph is a good illustration of the 
complexity of a transaction using title as a security device and 
of the predicament which is created for the bona fide third 
party. The case arose out of an application brought by Boland 
Bank for an order authorizing the Deputy-Sheriff of Durban to 
take possession of a 1973 model Audi 100 from the respondent, 
Joseph, and to deliver it to Boland Bank. The facts which gave 
rise to the application were as follows. In June 1973, Lenbou
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Motors (Pty) Ltd acquired a franchise to sell Audi and Volkswagen 
motor vehicles. On 27 June 1973, Lenbou entered into a so-called 
floor-plan agreement with a finance house which set out the terms 
on which the vehicles were acquired by Lenbou for purposes of re­
sale. The agreement reserved the right of ownership in the 
vehicles to the seller until the full price had been paid. 
Lenbou financed the purchase price of the vehicles by means of a 
time draft which was drawn on, and accepted, by the finance 
house, payable on 27 September 1973. Prior to acquiring this 
franchise, Lenbou had held a sub-agency to sell Peugot motor 
vehicles. In conducting the sub-agency, Lenbou had likewise 
entered into a floor-plan agreement with the applicant, Boland 
Bank, which had provided the financing for the purchase of Peugot 
motor vehicles for re-sale by Lenbou. That agreement had 
contained similar, though not identical terms with regard to the 
reservation of ownership, as those contained in the floor-plan 
agreement with the finance house. On 16 July 1973, Lenbou 
entered into an agreement with Boland Bank in terms of which it 
sold the Audi 100 to Boland Bank and simultaneously leased the 
vehicle back from Boland Bank. The object of these transactions 
was to enable Lenbou to acquire the Audi 100 for the private and 
business use of Hamlett, one of the directors of Lenbou, as the 
supplier insisted that a franchise-holder make use of its 
products. Similar transactions had in the past been concluded 
with Boland Bank in respect of Peugot vehicles which had been 
used by Lenbou as demonstration models and courtesy vehicles. 
Lenbou thus sold the Audi 100 to Boland Bank at a time when it 
had not yet acquired ownership of the vehicle in terms of the 
floor-plan agreement with the finance house. According to that 
agreement, ownership was only to pass on payment of the price. 
Payment was not affected until 5 October 1973 when the sight 
draft was presented for payment and met.49 Thereafter, on 18 
October 1973, Lenbou sold the Audi 100 on hire-purchase to Joseph 
and simultaneously ceded all its rights under the contract to the 
finance house which had provided the funds to enable Joseph to 
make the purchase. (This was the same finance house which had 
extended credit facilities to Lenbou, in terms of the floor-plan
agreement, to enable it to acquire the vehicles for the purpose 
of re-sale).
The question which the court had to decide was where the right of 
ownership in the Audi 100 vested. If Boland Bank was the owner, 
it was entitled to succeed in its application, unless Joseph was 
able to raise an estoppel to Boland Bank's vindicatory action. 
On the other hand, if ownership vested in Joseph, Boland Bank
could not succeed in its application. The court came to the
50conclusion that ownership lay with Boland Bank. It reasoned 
as follows. In terms of the floor-plan agreement, Lenbou was 
entitled to possession of the vehicles and to deal with them as 
owner by selling them. In other words, he acquired possessio 
civilis of the vehicles, ie the right to have physical detention 
of the vehicles with the intention of dealing with them as owner. 
When the sale and leaseback contracts were concluded with Boland 
Bank, Lenbou had not yet acquired ownership and, therefore, could 
not pass ownership to Boland Bank. Rather, it transferred to 
Boland Bank all the rights which it had to the Audi 100 in terms 
of the floor-plan agreement, namely the right to possessio 
civilis of the vehicle, together with the right to become the 
owner of the vehicle on payment of the price. It followed, 
therefore, so the court reasoned, that when the price was paid on 
5 October 1973, ownership did not vest in Lenbou, but passed to 
Boland Bank in terms of the contract for the sale of the Audi 100 
concluded with Boland Bank on 16 July 1973. In the result, when 
Lenbou purported to sell the Audi 100 to Joseph, the only right 
which it had in and to the car was the right to possess in terms 
of the lease agreement with Boland Bank. That, therefore, was 
all that Lenbou could transfer to Joseph on delivery of the 
vehicle to him pursuant to the contract of sale concluded with 
Joseph on 18 October 1973.
51The correctness of this decision has been queried. It seems 
clear that the court came to this conclusion on the basis of a
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value judgment. It was faced with the need to balance the
interests of two innocent parties, the financier, Boland Bank
and the innocent purchaser, Joseph, one of whom had to suffer at
the hands of the fraudulent and dishonest dealer, Lenbou. The 
court was placed in the position of having to make such a 
judgment because our legal system does not provide a satisfactory 
institution for the creation of real rights of security in
corporeal movable property. As we have seen, the use of title as 
a security device breaks down because third parties are not 
informed of the fact that ownership of the property, which serves 
as the object of the security, resides in someone other than the 
debtor. The only hope of the innocent third party, the innocent 
purchaser of such property, to ward off the vindicatory action 
of the true owner, the creditor, is where he can successfully 
plead an estoppel against the owner. To succeed in this defence, 
he must be able to show that the owner, negligently made or 
permitted a representation to be made that the debtor, the person
from whom he acquired the property, was the owner or had a ius
52disponendi. The innocent purchaser in these circumstances 
bears a very heavy evidential burden in this regard. How does 
he prove that the representation was culpably made? The mere
fact that the debtor had possession of the property is not 
54sufficient. In addition, it has been suggested that the fact
that the person from whom he acquired the property was a dealer
55in the class of goods concerned is not sufficient. Moreover,
in relation to motor vehicles, it has been held by the Appellate 
56Division that the fact that the car is registered in the name 
of the person from whom the vehicle was acquired by a bona fide 
purchaser cannot be relied upon, for the purpose of a defence of 
estoppel, as evidence that that person was the owner or had a ius 
disponendi.
It will be appreciated, therefore, that the use of title to 
provide security in corporeal movable property constitutes an 
inappropriate security device. It fails as an institution of 
real security by reason of the fact that it provides no means by
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which the world at large can be appraised of the fact that the 
right of ownership resides in someone other than the debtor in 
possession of the property. Bona fide third parties who have
dealings with the debtor are left wholly dependent upon the good 
57faith of the debtor. In other Civil Law based systems which, 
on account of the shortcomings of the institution of pledge in 
contemporary society, have resorted to the use of title in 
corporeal property as a security device for credit facilities 
advanced, the innocent third party who purchases from the debtor 
who has not yet acquired ownership does not find himself in the
same predicament as does his counterpart in South African law.
58 59This is so because in France and Germany, for instance, the 
bona fide acquisition of property in these circumstances is 
recognized and enforced. These systems have recognized the need 
to protect innocent purchasers in the interests of commerce and 
trade. Thus where an owner has voluntarily parted with 
possession to a person who disposes of the property to a bona 
fide third person, the owner loses his right to vindicate the 
property.60 Before attempting to suggest a possible solution to 
the problem, I would like to have a look at just one other aspect 
of the Law of Property which clearly illustrates my thesis that 
the depersonalization of the concept of ownership flowing from 
the use of security title, has created tensions in the Law of 
Property which cannot be resolved with reference to the existing 
principles of the law.
So far we have had a brief look at the difficulties brought about
by the depersonalization of the concept of ownership in relation
61to traditio as mode of acquisition of property. There are, 
however, other ways in which ownership can be acquired in South 
African law. These are the so-called original modes of 
acquisition of ownership. They are called original, because a 
person acquires ownership of property belonging to another, in 
certain circumstances, but not as a result of a deliberate 
intention of the parties to transfer ownership from one to 
another. One such mode of acquisition of ownership is known as
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accessio. This may come about as a result of the action of
nature, for instance, the progeny of animals and the production 
of fruits of trees. Accessio may also come about as a result of 
the intervention of man whereby two or more separate things are 
joined together in such a way that they henceforth form an 
entity. Where this joinder takes place in such a way that an 
accessory thing is added to a principal thing, the owner of the
principal thing, by virtue of his ownership of it, acquires
ownership of the accessory thing which is added to it. In
circumstances where accession takes the form of inaedificatio, ie
where a movable thing is added to an immovable in such a way that 
the owner of the immovable also becomes the owner of the movable, 
the depersonalization of the concept of ownership brought about 
by the use of title as a security device, has resulted in 
tensions in the law.
62
In accordance with the rule expressed by the maxim omne quod 
inaedificatur solo, solo cedit the permanent annexation of a 
movable to land or to buildings erected on land, in such a way 
that the movable loses its separate identity becomes the property 
of the owner of the land to which it has become attached by 
accessio. In determining when accessio in the form of 
inaedificatio can be said to have taken place three guidelines 
are applied by the courts: 63
(i) The nature of the movable thing;
(ii) the manner in which it has been affixed; and
(iii) the intention with which movable was attached at the time 
of its annexation.
According to the traditional approach, if upon a consideration of 
the first two guidelines, which are determined objectively, an 
unequivocal inference as to the intention with which the 
annexation was made results, the third guideline may be virtually
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ignored. On the other hand, if a consideration of these factors
produces an equivocal inference of intention, the third
64guideline, namely that of intention, becomes important. In
applying these guidelines, the courts initially looked to the
65intention of the person who made the annexation. Later,
however, it came to be realized that the annexor and the owner of 
the movable thing may not be the same person and the courts
started to emphasise that it is the intention of the owner of the
66movable property which must be looked to.
This change in emphasis is significant to my thesis for the case 
in which the change first took place, Mac Donald Ltd v Radin NO
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& The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd, raised the 
question as to whether a refrigeration plant which had been 
purchased on hire-purchase subject to the usual pactum reservati 
domini, acceded to the building to which it was annexed. As it 
turned out in that case, a consideration of the first two
guidelines namely, the nature of the thing and the manner of 
annexation, did not produce an unequivocal answer as to the
intention with which the attachment was made. It was possible
to remove the plant without appreciable damage to either the 
plant or the building, with the result that the intention with 
which it was annexed became of importance. Chief Justice Innes 
stated:68
'[T]he intention required (in conjunction with
annexation) to destroy the identity, to merge the
title, or to transfer the dominium of movable property, 
must surely be the intention of the owner. It is 
difficult to see by what principle of our law the 
mental attitude of a third party could operate to 
effect so vital a change.'
He continued: 69
'[It is] a fundamental principle that (subject to few 
exceptions) dominium cannot be transferred or altered, 
save by intent of the dominus.... A house acceded to the 
soil in which it was built; but even in that case the 
materials, if originally in different hands from the 
ownership of the soil, was governed in strict law by 
the state of mind of the dominus.'
In more recent years it has be held that this intention is to be 
determined upon a consideration of all three guidelines which 
carry almost equal weight.70 This new approach in essence seems 
to mean that the intention of the owner of the movable is really
the only criterion for determining whether an accession has taken 
71place or not. So much so is this the position, that there are 
cases in which the professed intention of the owner of the 
movable has been allowed to override the inference of intention 
which would otherwise be drawn from a consideration of the first 
two guidelines, namely, the nature of the thing and the manner of 
its annexation.
72The case of Melcorp SA v Joint Mutual Pension Fund (Tvl) 
provides a good illustration of the difficulty created by this 
approach. In this case Melcorp contracted with R Company for 
the supply and installation of two lifts in a building erected by 
R Company. The contract contained a pactum reservati domini 
reserving the right of ownership in the lifts to Melcorp until 
the final payment on the lifts had been made. The contract also 
reserved the right of Melcorp to repossess the lifts in the event 
of a default in payment, irrespective of the manner of their 
attachment to the realty. The finance for the erection of the 
building had largely been obtained by means of a loan from the 
Joint Mutual Pension Fund, the repayment of which was secured by 
a mortgage bond over the building in favour of the Joint Mutual 
Pension Fund. R Company fell into arrears with payment to
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Melcorp and under the bond to Joint Mutual Pension Fund. 
Ultimately the Joint Mutual Pension Fund foreclosed on the bond 
and caused the property to be sold in execution. It purchased 
the property at the sale in execution. Melcorp, thereafter, 
sought to enforce its right to remove the lift installation. The 
question which the court had to determine was whether or not the 
lifts had acceded to the building. McEwan J came to the 
conclusion that a consideration of the nature of the thing and 
the manner of attachment was inconclusive in determining whether 
the lifts could be said to have lost their separate identity so 
as to become part of the building. In the result, the intention 
of the owner of the lifts in making the attachment was deemed to 
be of paramount importance.
73McEwan J conceded that:
'[A] lift installation is an integral part of a multi­
story flat building. If those facts stood alone it 
would be a proper and necessary inference that the 
person who installed the lifts intended them to form 
part of the structure and consequently acceded to it.'
74However, the learned judge continued:
'In the circumstances it appears to me that it would 
quite artificial to impute a so-called 'real intention' 
to the plaintiff in conflict with such an unequivocal 
stated professed intention. It might be otherwise if 
the installation was (contrary to my earlier finding) 
not readily removable. In other words, after weighing 
together the inferences derivable from the nature of 
the installation against the evidence of the contract, 
I have formed a view that the annexor's intention was
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not to make the installation a permanent one until such 
time as the plaintiff had been paid for it.'
With respect to the learned judge, it is distinctly arguable that 
this is a case in which a consideration of the nature of the
thing and the manner of its annexation produced an unequivocal
75answer - the lifts acceded to the building. The lifts were 
built into the building and became part of the fabric of the 
building in the same way that the doors and windows and ceilings 
become part of the fabric of the building and hence accede to it. 
Doors and windows can be removed from a building without causing 
appreciable harm either to them or the building, but no-one would 
seriously suggest that they do not accede to the building in 
circumstances in which they have been sold on hire-purchase 
subject to a pactum reservati domini.
76Once again it is instructive to note that Melcorp's case 
involved a situation where movable property had been sold on 
terms and the seller reserved title in it as a security device 
until the full price had been paid. In the case of Theatre 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another v Butcher Bros Ltd (decided 
two years earlier by the Appellate Division) it was held that 
chairs and lighting equipment installed in a theatre building 
which were, likewise, removable without injury to themselves or 
the building, had acceded to the building so as to become 
immovable. The distinction between the cases lies in the fact 
that in the latter case, there was no reservation of title as a 
security device. Rather, the movables were annexed to the 
building by the owner of the movables.
The trend observable in recent cases seems to be that emphasis is
placed almost exclusively on the professed intention with which
7ftthe annexation was made, even to the extent that it may 
override the natural inference to be drawn from a consideration
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of the nature of the thing and the manner of its annexation.
79This shift in emphasis is welcomed by some writers, but
80criticized by others on the ground that it confuses the
requirements necessary for a translation of ownership by
traditio, a derivative mode of acquisition of ownership, with
those required for accessio which is an original mode of 
81acquisition of ownership. In the result, it would seem that in 
modern South African law there are no rules which can be applied 
in classifying things as either movable or immovable, for a 
thing may be movable today but immovable tomorrow when the last 
instalment on the agreed price has been paid. The courts in 
making the classification, in concrete fact situations, would 
seem to use such classification as a device to to resolve
conflicting interests in a manner which is deemed to be fair and
82equitable in the circumstances. The shift in emphasis to the
extent that the intention of the owner of the movable is now 
almost of paramount importance in determining when accessio in 
the form of inaedificatio has taken place, came about partly, if 
not entirely, as a result of a desire to give efficacy to the 
reservation of title in movable property as a security device. 
Clearly, if the professed intention of the owner who has sold the 
thing on credit, expressly reserving the right of ownership until 
the full price has been paid, can be overridden by an inference 
of intention drawn from the nature of the thing and the manner of 
its annexation, the very object of resorting to a reservation of 
title would be rendered nugatory. At the same time, however, it 
must be emphasized that the use of title in this way as a 
security device breaks down as an institution of real security 
because it fails to comply with the publicity requirement of a 
workable system of real security. How is a prospective 
purchaser or mortgagee to know that a lift installation in a 
multi-storeyed building, for instance, does not from part of the 
fabric of the building , but is liable to be removed by the 
supplier of the installation in the event of a default in the 
payment of the price of the lifts. 83
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I think that it will be apparent from consideration of the few 
cases which I have mentioned here tonight, that South African 
law has really reached an impasse. The use of title in hire- 
purchase transactions and "sale and leaseback transactions" is a 
wholly inappropriate means of providing security for the payment 
of a debt. It provides no machinery whereby members of the 
public at large can be informed of the creditor's right of 
security. At the same time the use of title as a security device 
in this way is firmly entrenched in our law.
How then are the problems which flow from the depersonalization 
of the concept of ownership brought about by the wide-scale use 
of title as a security device, in these kind of transactions, to 
be overcome? If the law is to fulfil its function of regulating 
the conduct of individuals in society and of provided a just and 
equitable sollution in circumstances in which a conflict of 
insterest arises, it is apparent that a change to the law is 
required. It seems to me that there are two possible solutions, 
both of which would require statutory intervention. The first 
would be to introduce a limitation upon the right of an owner to 
vindicate movable property, in certain circumstances. The 
limitation which I have in mind would be similar to that which 
exists in French and German law, in terms of which the bona 
fide acquisition of property by a third party from a person to
whom the owner had voluntarily given possession of his property
84should be recognised and enforced. Such a limitation would 
certainly go a long way to protect the interests of a bona fide 
third party who at present has no independent means of 
discovering any limitation upon the right of the person, from 
whom the property is acquired, to alienate it. Such a change in 
the law, however, would seriously impede commercial activity. 
It would deprive the creditor of the right of security which the 
reservation of title seeks to give him, unless suitable criminal 
sanctions could be introduced which would discourage the buyer 
from fraudulently acting in breach of his contract. A more 
fruitful and successful approach, it is submitted, would be to
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introduce legislation along the lines of the Special Notarial 
Bond Act of Natal so as to make it possible to create a real
right of security by means of a special notarial bond of
85movables. The registration of valuable movables should not
86present any real practical difficulty in the Deeds Registry. 
Moreover, with the computerization of the system of registration 
in the Deeds Registry there would be no real difficulty for 
prospective purchasers and creditors to undertake a search in 
the Deeds Registry so as to ascertain where the ownership of 
specific property lies and what real rights, if any, have been
7
conferred upon others in relation to specific property. To 
make the registration of real rights of security in movable 
property a workable system, however, it would be necessary, at 
the same time, to cut down on the effect of a reservation of
title in a hire-purchase sale and the effect of a "sale and
88leaseback transaction".
In conclusion Mr Vice- P r in c ip a l, sir, I would like to add that I 
consider it a great privilege to have known and to have had the 
opportunity to work together with Professor Kerr, especially is 
this so since we share an interest in and facination for the Law 
of Contract as a chosen field of specialization. Professor Kerr 
has set an extremely high ideal for anyone to try to emulate 
with his long list of published books in the field of the Law of 
Contract, which are cited by the courts and legal academics 
alike as authority on the South African law. It was with a 
little disappointment, in coming to Rhodes University, that I 
realized that I could not expect to teach much in the Law of 
Contract, however, that fact in itself has meant that I have 
acquired an interest in an equally fascinating and important 
branch of the Private law, namely the Law of Property.
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1 R W M Dias Jurisprudence 4ed (1976) 406ff; F H Lawson The
Rational Strength of English Law Hamlyn Lectures (1951) 79-
Though not free from criticism, private ownership of 
property has been the norm in most of Western Europe from 
the end of the Middle Ages. Various theories have been 
advanced over the ages in support of the notion of private 
ownership (see Roger A Cunningham, William A Stoebuck and 
Dale A Whitman The Law of Property 2ed (1984) 1ff ). In 
recent years a number of American scholars have advocated an 
economic theory of property. Thus R Posner Economic 
Analysis of Law (1972) 10-39, asserts that the legal 
protection afforded to property rights performs an important 
economic function by creating incentives for the efficient 
use of resources and is a normative proposition rather than 
a factual description of the way in which the rules of the 
Law of Property operate within the society. However, 
contrast the views of Karl Renner The Institutions of 
Private Law and their Social Functions (edited, with an 
introduction and notes by Otto Kahn-Freund, translated by A 
Schwarzschild) (1949) 83. Renner maintains that legal
institutions are normatively pure; that legal norms are 
indifferent towards their social functions and that any 
economic effect is extraneous to such norms.
2 See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren & James Russell Gordley The
Civil Law System : An Introduction to the Comparative Study
of Law 2ed (1977) 786.
3 See R L Birmingham (1970) 24 Rutgers LR 273 at 274 n3;
Friedrich Kessler & Grant Gilmore Contracts: Cases and
Materials 2ed (1970) 35.
4 E Allan Farnsworth (1969) 69 Columbia LR 576 at 578.
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5 C G van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) 2.
6 In socialist states such as that of the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, and indeed most of Eastern Europe, ownership of the 
"means of production" is vested in state owned enterprises 
charged with the allocation and distribution of resources. 
In socialist societies private ownership of property has not 
been entirely abolished. Private ownership is permitted in 
respect of property which is intended for the satisfaction 
of the citizen's material and cultural needs. A citizen 
may thus own income from work, savings, a house or part 
thereof, household articles for personal use and convenience 
and subsidiary house hold production. No citizen, however, 
may derive non-labour income from privately owned property 
(Art 105 of The Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic). From the outset, the Soviet political 
regime realized the potential of the use of land ownership 
as a tool of political, social and economic engineering. 
Within two weeks of its ascending to power, the Soviet 
Government established a monopoly of all land in the Soviet 
Union which remains absolute and unmitigated today. This 
monopoly extends not only to the soil but to everything 
attached to it by the course of nature - all minerals, 
water, forests (including all trees, herbage, birds and 
animals that inhabit the forests). Land in the Soviet Union 
is a res extra commercium. It cannot be the object of any 
commercial contract. It cannot be purchased or sold, 
mortgaged, leased, exchanged or disposed of by testamentary 
act to a third party by the original grantee. Modern Soviet 
law has established complex rules and regulations pertaining 
to the right of use of portions of the land by individual 
users, which are designed to secure the state's monopolistic 
dominium over all land in the Soviet Union. Even in 1948 
when the right to the private ownership of dwellings was 
introduced, the immutable principle of Soviet land law, that 
of state ownership, was preserved. This was achieved by the 
establishment of an artificial distinction between ownership
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of the house or an apartment in a block and the land upon 
which it stands. The recognition of ownership of private 
dwellings was necessitated by a need to overcome a housing 
shortage (see C Osakwe 1985 Acta Juridica 147).
7 See Harold J Berman and William R Greiner The Nature and 
Functions of Law (1972) 542.
8 F H Lawson loc cit.
9 See Silberberg and Schoeman The Law of Property 2ed by J 
Schoeman (1983) 5.
10 It is strictly speaking incorrect to speak of "hire-
purchaser transactions": these contracts are now termed
"instalment sale transactions" in terms of the Credit 
Agreements Act No 75 of 1980, which repealed and replaced 
the Hire-Purchase Act No 36 of 1942.
11 Which accounts for the general presumption of the law that 
the possessor of a movable thing is the owner and the age- 
old adage that possession is nine-tenths of the law. At the 
time when the concept of ownership or dominium was first 
developed, it constituted an expression of economic 
relations when the superstructure and the substructure of 
the institution were in conformity with one another (Renner 
loc cit 83). Since then, however, the function of ownership 
has in many instances altered without any change in the 
norms which make up the Law of Property. Ownership, has in 
some instances become a source of power which is not 
represented by actual control of the thing owned.
12 Thus, for instance, it may be said that property in a thing 
has passed when the right of ownership or title to the thing 
is transferred from one person to another. But when a 
person demands return of his property he does not demand 
return of the right of ownership. That he has never lost:
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rather, he insists that the subject matter of his right of 
ownership be handed back to him. Likewise, where it is said 
that there has been a disposition by a man of his property, 
that denotes the transfer of the right of ownership in a 
thing owned by him, irrespective of whether he parts with 
possession of the thing itself or whether he retains 
possession of the thing, but henceforth in some capacity 
other than that as owner. On the other hand, the removal of 
a man's property always requires that the thing itself be 
somehow or other dealt with, but does not necessarily 
involve a transfer or relinquishment of the right of 
ownership in respect of the thing.
13 The word "property" is not a term of art from which it can 
be inferred that a person is the owner of a particular 
thing.
14 Traditionally the Law of Property has been regarded as the 
pith and essence of private law. More and more, however,at 
least in relation to land, the Law of Property has become 
the concern of public law (see Carole Lewis 1985 Acta 
Juridica 241).
15 According to our Roman law sources, private law was divided
into three categories - the law relating to persons; the law 
relating to things and the law relating to actions (see D H 
Van Zyl Geskiedenis en Beginsels van die Romeinse
Privaatreg (1977) 122; Gaius Institutes 1.8 read with books 
2 and 3; Justinian Institutes 1.2.12 and D 1.5.1). The Law 
of Obligations and the Law of Succession was ius ad res 
pertinens and fell within the second category - the Law of 
Things. It followed from this that not only physical 
corporeal objects, but also rights because of their
identification with the objects to which they relate, were 
regarded as things or property in a legal sense. The Roman 
texts do not contain a comprehensive definition of a thing. 
Several attempts in this regard have been made, however.
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(See, for instance, Sohm Institutes 302, who defines a thing
as 'anything that can form part of a man's property__'.
See also J A C Thomas A Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 125
where a thing is defined as 'whatever could be assessed in 
terms of money, have a cash value placed upon it...any 
economic asset'). Similarly wide definitions are to be 
found in our Roman-Dutch common law sources (see, for 
instance, Grotius Inleiding 2.1.3; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Grotius 2.1.3; Voet 1.18.11; Van Leeuwen 
Het Roomsch Hollansch Recht 2.1.4,5; Censura Forensis 1.2.1; 
2.1.1) and in the writings of modern South African jurists 
(see H R Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The Union of South Africa: 
The Development of its Laws and Constitution (1961) 571; A F 
S Maasdorp Institutes of South African Law Vol II The Law of 
Property 10ed by C G Hall (1976) 1). So wide a definition 
of a thing has been criticized as being vague and 
unsatisfactory for the purposes of modern South African law. 
South African law, it is argued, draws a clear distinction 
between the legal relationships in the Law of Obligations, 
which give rise to personal rights, and the legal 
relationships in the Law of Property which give rise to real 
rights. Moreover, since the introduction of the concept of 
Executorship and the Administration of Estates, as a result 
of the influence of English law, the death of the decent, 
unlike the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, no longer 
vests ownership of the assets of the decedent in the heir, 
the Law of Succession is better categorized as falling 
outside the scope of the Law of Property. Finally, for the 
purposes of exposition, a distinction is customarily drawn 
between the various categories of rights in accordance with 
the nature of the object of the right, namely, between real 
rights in relation to physical corporeal things; personal 
rights in relation to performance due in terms of a 
contract; personality rights in relation to a person's 
reputation, etc and immaterial property rights in relation 
to patent, copy right etc. For these reasons some modern 
writers tend to limit the definition of a thing for the
- 6 -
purposes of the Law of Property to physical corporeal 
objects. (See W A Joubert (1958) THRHR 98 at 113-115; C G  
Van der Merwe Die Beskerming van Vorderingsregte uit Kontrak 
teen Aantassing deur Derdes (1959) 141; Silberberg and
Schoeman op cit 11; C G van der Merwe Sakereg op cit 18- 
19).
16 See Grotius Inleiding 2.1.58; Voet 5.2.1; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Grotius 2.1.58; Van der Linden Koopmans 
Handboek 1.6.1.
17 No real right is absolute in the sense that it operates 
against all legal subjects in all circumstances. The notion 
that a real right is binding on all the world, as it were, 
operates subject to the exception provided by the doctrine 
of estoppel.
18 The right of ownership of a person whose thing has been 
stolen may, for instance, be enforced against, and the 
property recovered from, whomsoever may be in possession of 
it and irrespective of whether that person is a thief, a 
purchaser in good faith and for value or any other person. 
Similarly, the holder of a right of servitude in respect of 
immovable property, for instance, has the power to exercise 
the right of servitude against not only the grantor of the 
right, but also, for the duration of his servitude, against 
all successors in title to the servient tenement and his 
creditors, irrespective of whether they had knowledge of the 
existence of the servitude or not.
19 See Voet 5.2.1.
20 Thus an intentional interference with or violation of a 
legal right of another, committed without justification and 
tending to injure the plaintiff is an actionable wrong in 
our law ( Solomon v Du Preez 1920 CPD 401 at 404; Isaacman v 
Miller 1922 TPD 56 at 61; Dunn v SA Merchants Combined
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Credit Bureau 1968 (1) SA 209 (C) at 215G). Likewise, in 
terms of the rule expressed by the maxim qui prior est
tempore potior est iure a person's knowledge of the 
existence of another person's personal right is binding on
the former (see J E Scholtens (1953) 70 SALJ 22 and (1954)
SALJ 71).
21 This , however, does not represent a complete list of
interests which exist between a person and a thing. (See A 
M Honore 'Ownership ' in Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (1961) 107; Carole Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 
241; Silberberg and Schoeman op cit 162).
22 The so-called absolute and unitary nature of ownership which 
is discernible in South African law, it seems is something 
that was not inherited from Roman-Dutch law, but evolved as 
a result of a reception of the highly individualistic 
theories of nineteenth century Pandectism (see D P Visser 
1985 Acta Juridica 39).
23 See Roger A Cunningham, William B Stoebuck and Dale A
Whitman The Law of Property 7.
24 See E G Broomberg Tax Strategy 2ed (1983) chapters 12 and
22.
25 Security for the payment of a debt or the performance of an
obligation may be furnished by way of personal security. 
This is achieved by means of the contract of suretyship in 
terms of which the creditor contracts with a third party (a
surety) to the effect that he will, on default of the
debtor, meet, in whole or in part, the obligation due by the 
debtor. The effect of this arrangement is to extend the 
creditor's right of action against the debtor, thereby 
giving his a right not only against the debtor, but also 
against the surety who has undertaken either primary or 
secondary liability depending upon the terms of the
s u r e t y s h i p  c o n t r a c t .
Rights of security may also be created in incorporeals by 
way of a cession in securitatem debiti in terms of which a 
debtor cedes to the creditor a right which he (the debtor) 
has against a third party, to secure the debt owed to the 
creditor. Though the precise nature of the institution by 
which rights are ceded in securitatem debiti is a matter in 
respect of which there has been considerable academic debate 
(see, for instance, J C De Wet & J P Yeats Die Suid- 
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4ed (1978) 366-7 and 
370ff; T K Pahl Die Aanwending van Vorderingsregte ter 
Versekering van Skulde 177ff (unpublished LLD thesis 
University of Stellenbosch 1972)); C G van der Merwe Sakereg 
480ff; Susan Scott The Law of Cession (1980) 135 et seq ; J 
R Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 56; G F Lubbe in W A Joubert (ed) 
The Law of South Africa XVII (1983) sv 'Mortgage and Pledge' 
para 482 nl6; Ellison Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law 
Through the Cases 2ed (1985) II 880n(a); H J Delport & N J J 
Olivier Sakereg Vonnisbundel (1985) 4l4n ; J R Harker 
(1986)) 103 SALJ 200) the cession of rights in securitatem 
debiti is firmly entrenched as a security device is South 
African law (Leyds NO v Noord-Westelike Kooperatiewe 
Landboumaatskappy Bpk en Andere 1985 (2) SA 769 (A); Marais 
en Andere NNO v Ruskin NO 1985 (4) SA 659 (A); Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v The Master and Others 1987 (1) 
SA 276 (A)). Where the right ceded in securitatem debiti is 
an incorporeal immovable , for instance, a mortgage of land 
or of a real right to land, such as a registered lease or 
sublease, to be effective in creating a right of security 
in the cessionary, the cession in securitatem debiti must be 
registered (Lief NO v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A) at 
273).
Apart from rights of security created by agreement between 
the parties, rights of security also come into existence 
simply by operation of law. Thus there are various tacit
-9-
hypothecs, for instance that, of the landlord in respect of 
arrear rent and tacit hypothecs created in term of some 
statute, for instance, that of the hire-purchase seller in 
terms of s 84 of the Insolvency Act No 24 of 1936. There 
are also various liens or rights of retention which secure a 
claim to compensation for improvements effected to property 
of another. (See in this regard C G van der Merwe op cit 
494ff; T J Scott (in W A Joubert (ed) The Law of South 
Africa XV (1981) sv "Liens" para 122-128; Delport and 
Olivier op cit 400-401). The seller of movable property in 
terms of a cash sale also enjoys a right of security in that 
ownership in the goods is reserved to him until such time as 
the price is paid (Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v 
Douglas 1956 (3) SA 420 (A); Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v 
Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another 1973 (3) SA 685 (A);
Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo 
Agricola 1976 (4) SA 464 (A); D H van Zyl (1974) 91 SALJ
337; J R  Harker (1974) 91 SALJ 350; M A K Lambiris (1985) 
102 SALJ 452). In order that third parties should not be 
misled, however, the seller's right of security arising out 
of the tacit reservation of ownership in the goods sold, is 
limited to the extent that he should within a reasonable 
period , in the event of non payment of the price, assert 
his right of ownership by reclaiming the goods (Nowell v 
Franzen 1956 (4) SA 35 (C); Pienaar v G North & Son (Pty) 
Ltd 1979 (4) SA 522 (0)).
27 No 18 of 1932. Section 2 of the Act provides that movables 
specially hypothecated by a notarial bond shall be deemed to 
have been pledged to the holder of the bond as security, in 
the same manner as if they had been delivered to him as a 
pledge. This section thus creates a possessionless pledge. 
To have the effect of creating a real right of security in 
this way, the goods must have been specially described and 
enumerated in the bond. Moreover, the movable must have been 
capable of being delivered to the bond holder at the time 
the bond was registered (Rosenbach & Co (Pty) Ltd v
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purposes of the Law of Property to physical corporeal 
objects. (See W A Joubert (1958) THRHR 98 at 113-115; C G  
Van der Merwe Die Beskerming van Vorderingsregte uit Kontrak 
teen Aantassing deur Derdes (1959)  141; Silberberg and
Schoeman op cit 11; C G van der Merwe Sakereg op cit 18- 
19).
16 See Grotius Inleiding 2.1.58; Voet 5.2.1; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Grotius 2.1.58; Van der Linden Koopmans 
Handboek 1.6.1.
17 No real right is absolute in the sense that it operates 
against all legal subjects in all circumstances. The notion 
that a real right is binding on all the world, as it were, 
operates subject to the exception provided by the doctrine 
of estoppel.
18 The right of ownership of a person whose thing has been 
stolen may, for instance, be enforced against, and the 
property recovered from, whomsoever may be in possession of 
it and irrespective of whether that person is a thief, a 
purchaser in good faith and for value or any other person. 
Similarly, the holder of a right of servitude in respect of 
immovable property, for instance, has the power to exercise 
the right of servitude against not only the grantor of the 
right, but also, for the duration of his servitude, against 
all successors in title to the servient tenement and his 
creditors, irrespective of whether they had knowledge of the 
existence of the servitude or not.
19 See Voet 5.2.1.
20 Thus an intentional interference with or violation of a 
legal right of another, committed without justification and 
tending to injure the plaintiff is an actionable wrong in 
our law ( Solomon v Du Preez 1920 CPD 401 at 404; Isaacman v 
Miller 1922 TPD 56 at 61; Dunn v SA Merchants Combined
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Credit Bureau 1968 (1) SA 209 (C) at 215G). Likewise, in 
terras of the rule expressed by the maxim qui prior est
tempore potior est iure a person's knowledge of the 
existence of another person's personal right is binding on
the former (see J E Scholtens (1953) 70 SALJ 22 and (1954)
SALJ 71).
21 This , however, does not represent a complete list of
interests which exist between a person and a thing. (See A 
M Honore 'Ownership ' in Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (1961) 107; Carole Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 
241; Silberberg and Schoeman op cit 162).
22 The so-called absolute and unitary nature of ownership which 
is discernible in South African law, it seems is something 
that was not inherited from Roman-Dutch law, but evolved as 
a result of a reception of the highly individualistic 
theories of nineteenth century Pandectism (see D P Visser 
1985 Acta Juridica 39).
23 See Roger A Cunningham, William B Stoebuck and Dale A
Whitman The Law of Property 7.
24 See E G Broomberg Tax Strategy 2ed (1983) chapters 12 and
22.
25 Security for the payment of a debt or the performance of an
obligation may be furnished by way of personal security. 
This is achieved by means of the contract of suretyship in 
terms of which the creditor contracts with a third party (a
surety) to the effect that he will, on default of the
debtor, meet, in whole or in part, the obligation due by the 
debtor. The effect of this arrangement is to extend the 
creditor's right of action against the debtor, thereby 
giving his a right not only against the debtor, but also 
against the surety who has undertaken either primary or 
secondary liability depending upon the terms of the
s u r e t y s h i p  c o n t r a c t .
Rights of security may also be created in incorporeals by 
way of a cession in securitatem debiti in terms of which a 
debtor cedes to the creditor a right which he (the debtor) 
has against a third party, to secure the debt owed to the 
creditor. Though the precise nature of the institution by 
which rights are ceded in securitatem debiti is a matter in 
respect of which there has been considerable academic debate 
(see, for instance, J C De Wet & J P Yeats Die Suid- 
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4ed (1978) 366-7 and 
370ff; T K Pahl Die Aanwending van Vorderingsregte ter 
Versekering van Skulde 177ff (unpublished LLD thesis 
University of Stellenbosch 1972)); C G van der Merwe Sakereg 
480ff; Susan Scott The Law of Cession (1980) 135 et seq ; J 
R Harker (1981) 98 SALJ 56; G F Lubbe in W A Joubert (ed) 
The Law of South Africa XVII (1983) sv ’Mortgage and Pledge’ 
para 482 nl6 ; Ellison Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law 
Through the Cases 2ed (1985) II 880n(a); H J Delport & N J J 
Olivier Sakereg Vonnisbundel (1985) 4l4n ; J R Harker 
(19861 103 SALJ 200) the cession of rights in securitatem 
debiti is firmly entrenched as a security device is South 
African law (Leyds NO v Noord-Westelike Kooperatiewe 
Landboumaatskappy Bpk en Andere 1985 (2) SA 769 (A); Marais 
en Andere NNO v Ruskin NO 1985 (4) SA 659 (A); Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v The Master and Others 1987 (1) 
SA 276 (A)). Where the right ceded in securitatem debiti is 
an incorporeal immovable , for instance, a mortgage of land 
or of a real right to land, such as a registered lease or 
sublease, to be effective in creating a right of security 
in the cessionary, the cession in securitatem debiti must be 
registered (Lief NO v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A) at 
273).
Apart from rights of security created by agreement between 
the parties, rights of security also come into existence 
simply by operation of law. Thus there are various tacit
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hypothecs, for instance that, of the landlord in respect of 
arrear rent and tacit hypothecs created in term of some 
statute, for instance, that of the hire-purchase seller in 
terms of s 84 of the Insolvency Act No 24 of 1936. There 
are also various liens or rights of retention which secure a 
claim to compensation for improvements effected to property 
of another. (See in this regard C G van der Merwe op cit 
494ff; T J Scott (in W A Joubert (ed) The Law of South 
Africa XV (1981) sv "Liens" para 122-128; Delport and 
Olivier op cit 400-401). The seller of movable property in 
terms of a cash sale also enjoys a right of security in that 
ownership in the goods is reserved to him until such time as 
the price is paid (Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v 
Douglas 1956 (3) SA 420 (A); Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v 
Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another 1973 (3) SA 685 (A);
Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo 
Agricola 1976 (4) SA 464 (A); D H van Zyl (1974) 91 SALJ
337; J R  Harker (1974) 91 SALJ 350; M A K  Lambiris (1985) 
102 SALJ 452). In order that third parties should not be 
misled, however, the seller's right of security arising out 
of the tacit reservation of ownership in the goods sold, is 
limited to the extent that he should within a reasonable 
period , in the event of non payment of the price, assert 
his right of ownership by reclaiming the goods (Nowell v 
Franzen 1956 (4) SA 35 (C); Pienaar v G North & Son (Pty) 
Ltd 1979 (4) SA 522 (0)).
27 No 18 of 1932. Section 2 of the Act provides that movables 
specially hypothecated by a notarial bond shall be deemed to 
have been pledged to the holder of the bond as security, in 
the same manner as if they had been delivered to him as a 
pledge. This section thus creates a possessionless pledge. 
To have the effect of creating a real right of security in 
this way, the goods must have been specially described and 
enumerated in the bond. Moreover, the movable must have been 
capable of being delivered to the bond holder at the time 
the bond was registered (Rosenbach & Co (Pty) Ltd v
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Dalmonte 1964 (2) SA 195 (N)). A special notarial bond only 
has the effect of creating such a real right of security in 
movables which are situate in Natal. Moreover, the right of 
security is lost in the event of the movables being moved 
from Natal and sold and delivered to a bona fide purchaser 
elsewhere in the country (Milne and Du Preez v Diana Shoe 
and Glove Factory (Pty) Ltd 1957 (3) SA 16 (W)).
28 The creditor obtains no real right in the movables which the 
debtor purports to hypothecate in terms of the bond. Such a 
bond merely confers upon the creditor a preference over the 
concurrent creditors of the debtor in the event of the 
debtor's insolvency. In the case of a general bond the 
preference extends to all movables owned by the debtor at 
the time of his insolvency and in the case of a special 
notarial bond over all movables specified therein. The 
preference is lost , however, should the debtor alienate or 
pledge the movables in contravention of the terms of the 
bond to a bona fide third party (Hare v Trustee of Health 3 
SC 32; Vrede Koop Landboumaatskappy Bpk v Uys 1964 (2) SA 
283 (0)). Actual knowledge of the existence of such a bond 
would have to be established before a third party could be 
said to have acted mala fide (Meyer v Botha and Hergenroder 
(1882) 1 SAP 47).
29 See J R Harker .(1981) 98 SALJ 56 at 61f; Ellison Kahn 
Contract and Mercantile Law Through the Cases 2ed (1985) II 
843; see also C G van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) 12f, 443 and 
491f.
30 The debtor must divest himself of control of the subject 
matter of the pledge. The reason for this rule is to prevent 
other persons from being misled into granting credit to the 
pledgor on the strength of a belief that he is possessed of 
assets which will be available to creditors for the purposes
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of execution of a judgment, or in the event of a coneursus 
creditorum ; as well as to prevent fraud being committed by 
a debtor in dealing with the property is if it was
unencumbered ( Lighter & Co v Edwards 1907 TS 442). It 
follows, therefore, that the doctrine of constitutum
possessorium can have no place in the case of pledge where 
the debtor is to remain in possession of the movable 
property to be used by him for his own benefit (Vasco 
Drycleaners v Twycross 1979 (1) SA 603 (A) at 612). The 
pledgee's possession must not only be effective, it must 
also be continuous. Thus a voluntary loss of possession by 
the pledgee will generally terminate the creditor's real 
right of security should he not recover possession before a 
bona fide third person acquires rights in the property 
(Standard Bank SA Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1968 (1) SA 
102 (T) at 109). A right of real security arising out of a
pledge, however, is not lost if the thing pledged is taken 
from the pledgee against his will. Even an acquisition of
the property by a bona fide third party for value does not
destroy the pledge (Heydenrich v Saber (1900) 17 SC 73) 
unless an estoppel can be raised against the pledgee. 
Moreover, it seems that the pledgee can by means of "quick 
pursuit" recover the thing not only from the spoliator but 
also from third parties (Theron v Gerber 1918 EDL 288).
31 National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Cohen's Trustee 1911 AD 
235 at 242. Thus on the insolvency of the debtor the 
creditor has a preferential real right to be paid out of the 
proceeds of the property and, moreover, were the debtor to 
sell the property the right of the creditor would be 
preferred to that of the buyer.
32 Roodepoort United Main Reef GM Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Du 
Toit No 1928 AD 66 at 71.
33 Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343. On the other hand, an 
agreement that the creditor may take over the property at a
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fair valuation has been held to be valid (Ex parte Mabunya 
(1903) 20 SC 165), as has an agreement that the creditor
may, on default of the debtor, sell the property without 
recourse to a court of law. In such a case, however, it is 
open to the debtor to obtain protection of the court by 
showing that the creditor in executing the agreement acted 
in a manner prejudicial to the rights of the debtor (Osry v 
Hirsch Loubser & Co Ltd 1922 CPD 531; Aitken v Miller 1951 
(1) SA 153 (SR) at 156).
34 The law reports abound with examples of innocent third
parties being compelled to part up with their purchases to 
the true owner of the goods which were originally sold on 
hire-purchase coupled with a pactum reservati domini (Morum 
Bros Ltd v Nepgen 1916 CPD 392; Lammers and Lammers v 
Glovannoni 1955 (3) SA 385 (A); Olivier v Van der Berg
1956 (1) SA 802 (C); Pennefather v Gokul 1960 (4) SA 42 (N); 
Forsdick Motors Ltd v Lauritzen & Another 1967 (3) SA 249 
(N); Hendler Bros Garage (Pty) Ltd v Lambons Ltd 1967 (4) SA 
115 (0); Westeel Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Sidney Clow & Co
Ltd 1968 (3) SA 458 (T); Jo’naadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) 
(Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA 394 (A); Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van 
der Watt 1975 (3) 734 (A)).
35 Crockett v Lezard 1903 TS 590 at 592f; Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Randles Bros Ltd 1941 AD 369 at 398; 
Lendalease Finance (Pty Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo 
Agricola supra.
36 See Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt supra at 745.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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40 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Bros Ltd loc 
cit. Trust Bank van Suid-Afrika v Western Bank 1978 (4) SA 
281 (A) at 301H-302A; Air-Kel (Edms) Bpk a/h Merkel Motors v 
Bodenstein 1980 (3) SA 917 (A) at 913H. In those systems 
which apply the causal theory of the passing of ownership 
delivery is seen merely as evidence of an intention to pass 
ownership and whether ownership passes on not depends upon 
the validity of the underlying causa. (See, for instance, 
the English case of Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459).
41 Lendalease (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola 
supra 498.
42 Ibid.
43 Thus at Amsterdam the seller was allowed a period of 6 weeks
within which to assert his right of ownership. At Leyden 
the period was fixed at 2 weeks ( Van leeuwen Censura 
Forensis 1.4.19.20; Van der Keessel Theses Selectae Th 203- 
Generally in relation to the Roman Dutch law in this regard 
see J R Harker The Nature and Scope of Rescission as a 
Remedy for Breach of Contract: A comparative study 187-190
(unpublished PhD thesis (Natal) 1981).
44 The ten day period prescribed by s 35 of the Insolvency Act
No 24 of 1936 provides a useful guide (Nowell v Franzen
supra at 38; Pienaar v G North & Son (Pty) Ltd supra ).
45 Daniels v Cooper (1880) 1 EDC 174; Fazi Booy v Short (1882)
2 EDC 301; Quirk's Trustee v Assignees of Liddle & Co (1885)
3 SC 322; Leo v Loots 1909 TS 366; McDonald Ltd v Radin NO & 
The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454.
46 Boland Bank Bpk v Joseph 1977 (2) SA 82 (D); Western Bank
Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (2) SA 1008 (0); Trust 
Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western Bank Bpk supra; Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk v Van Jaarsveldt; Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v
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Bitzer 1978 (4) SA 115 (0). The courts have approached
these transactions with caution. They have emphasized the 
need to be satisfied that there existed a genuine intention 
to transfer ownership in terms of the transactions and that 
they were not simply simulated ( see Boland Bank Bpk v 
Joseph supra at 86-7; Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western 
Bank Bpk supra at 301-2; Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Van 
Jaarsveldt; Bitzer supra at 124-5 and 127; Delport v Strydom 
& Another 1977 (3) SA 325 (0)).
47 Supra.
48 Supra.
49 Lenbou had requested an extension of time for payment to 
which the finance house agreed.
50 At 89.
51 See C G van der Merwe Sakereg 218; D S P  Cronje 1977 THRHR 
391.
52 It in not enough to prove that he was misled by the 
representation made by the owner, he must go further and 
establish that the misrepresentation came about as a result 
of negligence on the part of the owner. Failure to 
establish such negligence will mean that his defence of 
estoppel will fail (Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v 
Douglas supra; Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 
supra; Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A)).
53 See the criticism of the need to establish negligence as a 
requirement of the defence of estoppel to a vindicatory 
action expressed by Rumpff JA in Johaadien's case supra at 
412A-B; Amicus Curiae (1977) 94 SALJ 256 at 257.
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54 See Lawless v Lane 1909 TS 589; D J Joubert Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg (1979) 124.
55 See Electrolux (Pty) Ltd v Khota 1961 (4) SA 244 (W) at 247;
Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Fourie 1979 (4) SA 157 (C).
While that may be the case in relation to the application of 
the defence of estoppel and the application of the doctrine 
of apparent authority in the law of agency (Pretorius v 
Loudon 1985 (3) SA 845 (A)), it is not the case, it is 
submitted, in relation to the application of the rule 
relating to the sale of movable property by a factor or an 
agent for sale. Seventeenth century Roman-Dutch law, which 
forms the basis of modern South African law, found it
necessary, in the interests of commerce and trade, to 
protect bona fide third parties by placing limitations on 
the right of an owner to vindicate his property in certain 
circumstances. Thus we have seen that the rule of Roman law 
that ownership of movable property sold in terms of a cash 
sale does not pass until the price is paid, was ameliorated 
in Roman-Dutch law to the extent that the seller wishing to 
retain the security of ownership of the property had to 
assert his right of ownership within a specified period. 
Likewise, it was, inter alia, a rule of Roman-Dutch law than 
an owner could only recover his property from a bona fide 
purchaser who had acquired the property from a factor or 
agent for sale if he compensated the purchaser in the amount 
of the purchase price ( Voet 6.1.12; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Grotius 2.3.5. Van der Keessel 368nl4 
indicates several decisions of the court of Holland to this 
effect). It was believed that this rule formed part of 
modern South African law (Adams v Mocke (1906) 23 SC 782; 
Morum v Nepgen supra; Ross v Barnard 1951 (1) SA 414(T) at 
418; Blackwood Hodge South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Elco Steel 
Dealers 1978 (3) SA 852 (C) at 856; Grosvenor Motors
(Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas supra at 427 A). It is
submitted that this rule, though not expressly so stated, 
formed the basis of the decision of the court in United Cape
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Fisheries (Pty) Ltd v Silverman 1951 (2) SA 612 (T) and 
Akojee v Sibanyoni 1976 (3) SA 940 (W) (see the comments on 
the case by Amicus Curiae (1977) 94 SALJ 256; A J Kerr 
(1977) 94 SALJ 260). In a recent decision of the Appellate 
Division, Pretorius v Loudon supra, Rabie C J in an obiter 
dictum (at 13) expressed doubt as to whether the rule had 
become part of South African law and indeed, whether it 
should be recognized as part of modern South African law. 
The learned Chief Justice seemed to be of the opinion that 
the rule had in fact been supplanted by the doctrine of 
estoppel and the doctrine of apparent authority in our 
modern law of agency. It is submitted that there is a very 
real need for the rule pertaining to the sale of movable 
property by a factor or agent for sale in modern South 
African law. The rule constitutes an exception to the 
general rule of our law that in order to succeed in a 
defence of estoppel to a vindicatory action brought by the 
owner of the property, the bona fide purchaser must prove 
fault on the part of the owner in misleading him or 
permitting him to be misled that the person from whom the 
property was acquired had a ius disponendi. The rejection 
of the rule is to be regretted as a retrograde step. In 
passing it is worth noting that English and American law 
also found it necessary to introduce special protection for 
the bona fide acquirer of property from an agent whom, by 
the very nature of his business, the purchaser was entitled 
to assume that he was the dominus or had a ius disponendi 
(see s 2(1) of the English Factors' Act of 1889 and s 2- 
403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code and the American 
Restatement Second, Agency ss 175 and 201; J R  Harker 1986 
THRHR 411 at 419-8). However, contrast the view taken by 
Carole Lewis (1986) 103 SALJ 69. The author supports the 
notion that the so-called 'factor or agent for sale' rule 
has been subsumed by the doctrine of estoppel. Realising 
the need to protect the interests of the bona fide acquirer 
of the property, however, she suggests (at 82) that the 
owner should be presumed to have been negligent for the
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purpose of a defence based upon estoppel to the owner's 
vindicatory action in circumstances where the property was 
acquired from a factor or agent for sale. The onus thus
would be cast upon the owner to rebut the presumption of 
negligence, rather than impose the evidential burden upon 
the bona fide acquirer of the property, to establish 
negligence on the part of the owner, and against whom the 
scales would otherwise be too heavily weighted. This is not 
an unattractive thesis. It fails , however, to take account 
of the fact, as is clearly indicated by the facts of 
Pretorius v Loudon supra, that neither the doctrine of 
estoppel nor the rules relating to apparent authority in 
the Law of Agency suffices to do justice to the bona fide 
acquirer of property from a factor or agent for sale (J R 
Harker 1986 THRHR at 415).
56 Pretorius v Loudon supra at 859. Notwithstanding that the 
owner had given the registration certificate of the vehicle 
to the fraudulent dealer which made it possible for him, by 
forging the owner's signature on the requisite transfer 
forms, to obtain registration of the car in the name of the 
dealer. See also Akojee v Sibanyoni supra at 442 where it 
was held that possession or otherwise of the registration 
certificate and license of a vehilce cannot be relied upon 
as indicative of the fact that person in possession either 
has or does not have a ius disponendi, as they are not 
documents of title to the motor vehicle. The question as to 
where ownership of the vehicle vests is a matter governed by 
the common law. See also Broekman v TCD Motors (Pty) Ltd 
1949 (4) SA 418 (T) where Dowling J (at 423-425) declined
to follow the lead given by Murray J in Bold v Cooper 1949 
(1) SA 1195 (W) who would apparently have been prepared to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel had the "change of ownership 
notice" signed by the owner been exhibited to the bona fide 
third party by the person who wrongfully disposed Of the 
vehicle.
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57 It is of course not only the bona fide acquirer of property 
from the debtor who may be misled. The depersonalization of 
ownership brought about by the use of title as a security 
device may also work to the prejudice of other creditors of 
the debtor. For instance, they may contract with him on the 
strength of the belief that, in the event of non-
performance, they will be able to execute against his assets 
only to find that ownership of some or other of these assets 
vests in someone else. It is for this very reason that 
courts look with suspicion upon constitutum possessorium as 
a mode of transfer of ownership of movable property ( 
Goldinger's Trustee v Whitelaw & Son 1917 AD 66) and have 
frequently struck down as simulated transactions a sale and 
resale of movable property on the ground that the true 
intention of the parties was to create a possessionless 
pledge (see , for instance, Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 
supra).
58 Article 1141; 2279 and 2280 of the French Civil Code.
59 Section 929 and 932 of the BGB.
60 Both French and German law, however, preserve the right of 
the owner to recover his property in those circumstances in 
which he did not voluntarily part up with possession to 
someone, who in breach of good faith, disposed of the 
property, but where the property was lost or stolen from him 
(J R Harker 1986 THRHR 411 at 421 - 22).
61 It, is of course, the most important and most frequently 
used mode of acquiring ownership.
62 Accessio in the context of the Law of Property literally 
means the increase or addition to a thing.
63 These three guidelines were first laid down for South 
African law in Olivier and Others v Haarhof & Co 1906 TS
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497 at 500. They were applied by the Appellate Division in 
MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & 
Industries Co Ltd supra at 466 and have been applied in 
numerous cases ever since.
64 The MacDonald case supra at 467. The third criterion
mentioned above has often been said to be the most
important of the three criteria (see the MacDonald case loc 
cit; Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle 1916 
AD 561 at 564; Standard-Vacuum Refining Co of South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council 1961 (2) SA 669 (A) at
677H).
65 Olivier and Others v Haarhof & Co loc cit; Victoria Falls 
Power Co Ltd v Colonial Treasurer 1909 TS 140 at 145; 
Deputy-Sheriff of Pretoria v Heymann 1909 TS 280 at 284; the 
Mac Donald case supra at 466 and 476; Newcastle Collieries 
Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle loc it.
66 The MacDonald case supra at 467; Land and Agricultural Bank 
of SWA v Howaldt and Vollmer 1925 SWA-34 at 37; CIR v Le 
Seur 1960 (2) SA 708 (A) at 712 and 718.
67 Supra.
68 At 467.
69 At 468.
70 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978
(3) SA 682 (A) at 688D-H; Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint
Municipal Pension Fund (Tvl) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) at 222-3; 
Carole Lewis (1979) 96 SALJ 94 at 106.
71 Carole Lewis loc cit.
72 Supra.
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73 At 222F.
74 At 224 B-C.
75 That being the case , according to the traditional approach, 
the professed intention of the owner of the movable was 
really irrelevant.
76 Supra.
77 Supra.
78 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another v Butcher Bros Ltd 
loc cit; Melcorp SA v Joint Mutual Pension Fund (Tvl) loc 
cit; Carole Lewis loc cit. It has recently been argued that 
the third-mentioned guideline for determining whether or not 
an accession has taken place, namely, the intention with 
which the movable is annexed to the immovable, although said 
to be based upon Roman-Dutch authorities, in fact, has come 
about as a result of the influence of English law (see C G 
van der Merwe Sakereg 164-8).
79 Carole Lewis (1979) 96 SALJ 94 at 105-7.
80 Van der Merwe loc cit; Silberberg and Schoeman op cit at
220.
81 Van der Merwe op cit 168.
82 Silberberg and Schoeman op cit at 222.
83 Melcorp SA v Joint Mutual Pension Fund (Tvl) supra; Van der
Merwe op cit at 12, 13 and 491; Silberberg and Schoeman op
cit at 220. Silberberg and Schoeman loc cit state that the 
role of intention in determining whether accessio in the
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form of inaedificatio can be said to have taken place needs 
careful reconsideration. Moreover, in relation to the shift 
in emphasis observable in recent cases, it is stated that 
the approach initially adopted by the courts has the 
advantage of a built-in safeguard and protection of bona 
fide third parties, where the physical features clearly 
point to the permanency of the annexation. Bona fide third 
parties and particularly (potential) creditors often have 
nothing other than an inference to be drawn from the 
physical features to rely upon.
84 Page 11 supra ; J R Harker 1986 THRHR op cit at 421-422. 
English law has also recently introduced special protection 
along similar lines in relation to the bona fide acquisition 
by a private person of a motor vehicle, which is subject to 
a hire-purchase sale, from a seller who is not the owner of 
the car. Schedule 4, para 22 of the Consumer Credit Act of 
1974 provides that the innocent purchaser in these 
circumstances will acquire a good title to the vehicle.
85 Note 26 supra.
86 Van der Merwe op cit at 492.
87 The use of a special notarial bond to create a real right of 
security in movable property does not appear to have created 
any major difficulties in Natal. The computerization of the 
system of registration in the Deeds Registry would mean 
that a creditor, by conducting a search in the Deeds 
Registry, should be able to ascertain what real rights by 
way of a special notarial bond have been created anywhere in 
South Africa in respect of specific assets of a particular 
person. In the state of Louisiana it was, likewise, found 
necessary to introduce a so-called "chattel mortgage" making 
it possible to create a real right of security in movable 
property because the pledge of movables no longer satisfied 
the needs of society. A "chattel mortgage" in Louisiana
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creates a privilege and does not involve a transfer of title 
in the property. It works in the same way as the pledge of 
movables. It confers on the secured creditor a right of 
preference to be paid out of the proceeds of the property 
and also the right to follow up the movable where alienated 
in contravention of his real right in the property. The
holder of a chattel mortgage may also enforce his right 
where a corporeal movable has been so attached to an 
immovable as to become part and parcel of the immovable 
(Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Vol 2 "Property" by A N
Yiannopoulos (1967) s 105). This would thus clearly cater 
for the problems which arose in the MacDonald case and the 
Melcorp case without doing violence to the principles which 
govern the immobilization of movables by accessio.
88 Once the special notarial bond of movables is established as 
a form of real security in South African law there would be 
no need to resort to use of title in an instalment sale 
transaction and in the so-called "sale and leaseback
transaction" as a security device. However, should the 
total rejection cf the effect of the reservation or
acquisition cf title in these sort of transactions be seen 
as too drastic a change in the law, it may be possible to 
cut down on their effect by providing that a creditor will 
only enjoy the real right cf ownership in the property if 
the contract is registered in the Deeds Registry. See, for 
instance, the provisions of s 20 in the Alienation of Land 
Act No 68 of 1981 which provides for the recording cf a 
contract for the sale of land on instalments. The object of 
recording the contract is to protect the interests of the 
buyer of the property against the subsequent acquisition of 
real rights in the property which forms the subject matter 
of the sale.
